Ricoeur's Philosophy of Imagination by Taylor, George H.
Journal of  French Philosophy
Volume 16, Numbers 1 and 2, Spring-Fall 2006
Ricoeur’s Philosophy of  Imagination
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In her foreword to the French translation of  Paul Ricoeur’s Lectures on
Ideology and Utopia, Myriam Revault d’Allonnes maintains that if  there is
one philosophical problem that pervades a number of  Ricoeur’s
inquiries, it is that of  imagination.1 I agree. Yet in Ricoeur’s published
work we find only scattered references to this topic2 and no
comprehensive development on this subject so apparently central to
his thinking.  My claim is that scholarly attention to Ricoeur’s
unpublished “Lectures on Imagination” may redress this lacuna in his
work.3 These Lectures provide the only place where we find a more
complete structural framework of  Ricoeur’s argument as it moves from
an analysis of  reproductive to productive imagination.
My comments are based on a transcription of  Ricoeur’s
Lectures, which were delivered at the University of  Chicago in the fall
of  1975. These Lectures came at a critical cusp in Ricoeur’s career.
Ricoeur’s other set of  lectures that term were the ones on ideology and
utopia that I later edited for publication.4 Ricoeur’s book on metaphor,
La métaphore vive,5 had just been published, and elements of  that work
are revived in the Lectures. Late in the Lectures his subsequent work
on narrative is also foreshadowed. At this central juncture, Ricoeur is
crystallizing his thoughts on poetics (and so fulfilling in a recast way
the third part of  his Philosophy of  the Will).6 Imagination lies at the
heart of  his thinking at this time.
Let me sketch where Ricoeur is headed in the “Lectures on
Imagination” and then provide a sense of  the steps he takes to get
there. I’ll end with some general thoughts on his theory.  Ricoeur is
driving toward the development of  a theory of  productive imagination
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as opposed to one of  reproductive imagination, and he maintains that
there are four domains of  productive imagination.7 First, within the
domain of social and cultural imagination, utopia is the fiction that
exemplifies productive imagination. The dialectic between utopia and
ideology – ideology being reproductive social imagination – was the
subject of  his separate lectures on that topic. Part of  the great
fascination, then, of  hearing both sets of  lectures was the commonality
between them of  the theme of  imagination. Ricoeur adverts to utopia
at points in the imagination lectures as well. The second and third
domains of  productive imagination are epistemological imagination
and poetic imagination, and both are principal subjects in the imagination
lectures. The fourth domain is that of  religious symbols and is treated
elsewhere in Ricoeur’s corpus.8
Part of  Ricoeur’s central goal in the imagination lectures is to
demonstrate that imagination is not something marginal to or occasional
in thought but rather permeates all thought and conceptualization. We
have learned, says Ricoeur, from both the psychology of  perception
and ordinary language philosophy that there is no such thing as a brute
impression, an impression that is direct and unadorned by human
structuring.9 Instead, perception is always structured by physiological
and imaginative processes. Citing Kant, Ricoeur contends that the
“imagination is not at all an alternative to perception [as it is in Hume]
but [is] an ingredient of  perception. It’s encapsulated within the
framework of  perception.”10 Elsewhere in these materials Ricoeur argues
that “[w]e can no longer oppose . . . imagining to seeing, if  seeing is
itself  a way of  imagining, interpreting, or thinking.”11
In the Lectures, Ricoeur challenges the history of  Western
thought not only in its general failure to comprehend the interrelation
of imagination and seeing but also in its almost singular emphasis –
aside from Aristotle and Kant, to whom I will return – on the
reproductive imagination to the exclusion of  the productive imagination.
The first two major sections of  the Lectures are devoted to this
exploration and criticism of  the role reproductive imagination has played
in major classical and contemporary figures in Western thought. Part
of  the power of  Ricoeur’s work here, as throughout his corpus, is that
his philosophy is not insular, talking only with those who are like-minded,
but is willing to address, incorporate, but also demonstrate the
insufficiency of  other fields. Just as in his earlier attention to Freud12 or
to structuralism13 where Ricoeur analyzed these fields according to their
own terms and then showed the space they allowed for his own
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hermeneutics, in the imagination lectures Ricoeur takes on, for example,
psychology and analytic philosophy and argues that their attention to
reproductive imagination still leaves space for productive imagination.
A continuing question he pursues in the Lectures is whether fields
such as analytic philosophy are able to address adequately human
creativity.14
Let me survey Ricoeur’s development of  the history of
reproductive imagination in the West to set the stage for what he
promotes by contrast in the productive imagination. Dating back to
Plato, the character of  the imagination has typically been subsumed
under study of  what it is to have an image, an image, supposedly in the
mind’s eye, of  reality. The rationalist Plato will distinguish images from
the true concepts that lie in the Ideas, the Forms,15 while the empiricist
Hume will seek to understand the movement from sensory impressions
to images to the association of  images that provide concepts.16 For
Spinoza the imagination is equivalent to inadequation: illusion, prejudice,
something lacking.17 For religious Pascal, imagination is sophistry,
deception.18  Even as twentieth century philosophy of  logic turned
away from the image to concentrate on the logic of  the proposition,19
the image remained the subject of  discussion in the philosophy of
mind.20  Ryle dismissed the existence of  the image21 – the mind was the
proverbial ghost in the machine22 – while others, such as the little known
H.H. Price, considered what it meant to think in or through images.23
In each case where the image was discussed, there was a distinction
between an original – reality – and a copy – the image or the imagination,
and in each case, the copy was always less than the original.24
For Ricoeur, this model of  original and copy exemplifies
reproductive imagination. The image as copy is at best derivative from
the original – from reality. At worst, to the degree the imagination tries
to portray something different from the original, it is simply marginal,
an escape or flight from reality; it produces nothingness.25 The history
of  Western thought – again with the principal exceptions of  Aristotle
and Kant – is one of  attention to reproductive imagination only. Two
more contemporary examples provide additional clarifications of
Ricoeur’s point. Although his work does not regard the image but
language use, Wittgenstein is the subject of  one lecture. Ricoeur finds
provocative in Wittgenstein the interchange, so important for Ricoeur,
between language and seeing. Our language may be well-adapted to
deal with objects, but it does not encompass so well how the mind
“sees” pictures such as the famous duck-rabbit, where we view the
GEORGE H. TAYLOR
96
same sketch alternatively as that of  a duck or that of  a rabbit.26 Our
reports of  these experiences “constitute a struggle with words,” and
the task, says Wittgenstein, is to rework the report, which interestingly
goes beyond acceptance of  meaning as use.27 But this fight between
seeing and thinking28 in Wittgenstein remains at the level of
reproduction. In the pictures such as the duck/rabbit, Ricoeur claims,
“there is nothing productive.”29
A second contemporary example lies in Sartre’s psychology
of  the imagination. For Sartre, “‘the imagination is the necessary
condition for [human] freedom’.”30 Sartre locates freedom through a
theory of  “nothingness,” that is, of  the unreal, that which escapes
from the boundaries of  current empirical reality. As we shall see, Ricoeur
wants to build on Sartre’s theory of  the unreal to develop his own
approach to productive imagination, but Ricoeur finds a fatal limitation
in Sartre’s theory. Sartre illustrates the ability of  human thought to
have an image of  the unreal on the basis of  an image of  someone
absent, his friend Peter in Berlin. But this image is itself  reproductive,
because it is an analogue of  an original, the real Peter.31 Absence is
conceived as “paradigmatic for nothingness,”32 but this reduces it to
the theory of  nothingness.33 “Presence and absence are distinctions
relative to [current empirical] reality.”34 Absence is a copy – a form of
reproductive imagination – of  someone present.
With this welter of  emphases in Western thought on
reproductive imagination, how then does Ricoeur propose by contrast
to establish productive imagination? He probes whether we can conceive
of  a place that, unlike an image, is not duplicative of, not determined
by, an original. Perhaps the easiest example to comprehend is the social
utopia. The literal translation of  utopia is a “nowhere.”35 The utopia is
“the possibility of  [the] nowhere in relation to [our] social condition.”36
At its best, the utopia is not only an escape from reality, but it points to
a new kind of  reality.37 It expands our sense of  reality and reality’s
possibilities. Other examples Ricoeur provides include Aristotle’s
portrayal of  Greek tragedy, one of  the few prior instances of  attention
in Western thought to the role of  productive imagination. For Aristotle,
the tragedy is not a copy or reduplication of  human life but on the
contrary has a “power of  disclosure concerning reality.” Aristotle’s
conception of  imagination is thus directed against Plato’s notion of
imagination as a shadow.38 Ricoeur also cites Impressionism as another
example of  productive imagination. Impressionism, he says, created “a
new alphabet of  colors capable of  capturing the transient and fleeting
RICOEUR’S PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGINATION
97
with the magic of  hidden correspondences. And once more reality was
remade, with an emphasis on atmospheric values and light
appearances.”39 Yet another Ricoeur example, here borrowed from E.
H. Gombrich, is landscape painting. The invention of  landscape painting
was “at the same time for us a new way of  looking at nature as a
landscape.” There was an “augmentation of  our world.”40 Surprisingly,
Kant is not particularly helpful in developing Ricoeur’s theme of
productive imagination’s augmentation of  reality, as in the First Critique41
the role of  productive imagination was limited to human understanding
of  an existing empirical object,42 and in the Third Critique43 productive
imagination was subjective, tied to aesthetic judgments of  taste that
had no effect on reality.44
Ricoeur argues more generally that the “nowhere” not bound
by an original can be found in fiction. “Because fictions don’t reproduce
a previous reality, they may produce a new reality. They are not bound
by an original that precedes them.”45 For Ricoeur, three of  the four
domains of  productive imagination – social and cultural imagination
(the utopia), epistemological imagination, and poetic imagination —
come under the rubric of  being fictions in this sense.46 Having already
mentioned the utopia, let me specify the productivity of  epistemological
and poetic imagination. The fiction in epistemological imagination is the
theoretical model that is available in science. A new language is
introduced that is then applied to and refigures a domain of application.47
An example from Max Black mentioned by Ricoeur is Maxwell’s
“representation of  an electrical field in terms of  the properties of  an
imaginary incompressible fluid.”48  The application of  the model to
the “originary domain extends and changes this domain.” The model
as applied “provides a new description of  reality.”49 Similarly, poetic
imagination at its best also unfolds new dimensions of  reality. It helps
us go beyond the world of  objects and opens a larger “pre-objective
apprehension,” a dimension as well the target of  Heidegger.50
“[M]etaphor is to poetic language what the [theoretical] model is to
epistemology.”51 Both can alter reality.
In his emphasis on fiction as the “nowhere” of  social,
epistemological, and poetic imagination, Ricoeur certainly understands
that this “nowhere” is not totally and absolutely “nowhere,” completely
uninformed by what has gone before. In fact, he argues against this
Romantic view of  the imagination.52 The productive imagination is
“not something irrational,” he says; “it must be categorial in order to
be transcategorial.”53 To be effective, the productive imagination must
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transform existing categories; it cannot exist totally outside and separate
from them. This suggests that any transformative fiction – any utopia,
any scientific model, any poem – must have elements of  reproductive
imagination, must draw from existing reality sufficiently so that its
productive distance is not too great. For example, Impressionism is
productive but also, as figurative, still reproductive in part.54 Yet the
important point remains that productive imagination does introduce a
fiction, an image without an original, something from nowhere. Only
in this way is it transformative of  existing reality.
Part of  the great insight and merit of  Ricoeur’s theory of
productive imagination is that it helps both to explain the nature of
human creativity and to show its commonality across different spheres,
whether that creativity take the form of  social, epistemological, or poetic
imagination.55 Unlike standard approaches to creativity, which either
avoid the issue or, as in Karl Popper’s work, call “a logic of  discovery”
what is actually a “logic of  verification or falsification of  what has been
already discovered,”56 Ricoeur’s theory works to unfold the logic of
discovery itself. (He does acknowledge that there remains a final element,
the “kernel of  opacity” that is the transposition itself, that cannot be
analyzed.57)
When Ricoeur locates the productive imagination in fiction, in
the “nowhere” that fiction provides, the paradox is that fiction provides
a new dimension of  reality. Unlike Kant, for Ricoeur the productive
imagination is “connected with an ontology.”58 If  in fiction, says Ricoeur,
“we start with an image without an original, then we may discover a
kind of  second ontology which is not the ontology of  the original but
. . . the ontology displayed by the image itself, because it has no original.”59
Ricoeur’s theory of  productive imagination requires revision not only
of  our concept of  reality but also of  our concept of  truth. No longer
is truth defined in terms of  “adequation,” a conformity between
judgment and existing reality, because the disclosure of  new reality has
more to do with a concept of  truth as manifestation.60
The distinctiveness of  Ricoeur’s approach to productive
imagination is perhaps best established by comparison to the philosophy
of  Hegel. When Hegel concludes the Preface to his Philosophy of  Right,
he famously writes that philosophy “appears only when actuality is
already there cut and dried after its process of  formation has been
completed.” Like the owl of  Minerva, Hegel says, philosophy “spreads
its wings only with the falling of  the dusk.”61 Ricoeur’s theory of
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productive imagination takes a very different stance as it alerts us to
disclosure of  reality that is both available and yet to come.
Let me conclude with two sets of  thoughts, both of  which
take us beyond the strict confines of  the imagination lectures. First, I
want to suggest very briefly the nexus between Ricoeur’s work on
productive imagination and metaphor. Metaphor arises to cross the
gap between terms that present a lack of  literal fit or common identity.
To characterize something metaphorically as “like” something else is,
says Ricoeur, “to see the same in spite of, and through, the different.”62
This metaphoric creation of  resemblance across difference is also an
act of  imagination.63 “Imagination,” Ricoeur writes, “is this ability to
produce new kinds of assimilation and to produce them not above the
differences, as in the concept, but in spite of  and through the
differences.”64 The imaginative interrelation across difference creates
new metaphoric resemblance.65
A final set of thoughts responds to the question asking whether
productive imagination as a “fiction” opens the way to choices made
upon the basis of  ideology rather than sound policy or legal
determination. How do we distinguish creative from distortive uses of
imagination? In the imagination lectures, Ricoeur adverts at points to
these concerns. As previously mentioned, he observes that for Spinoza
imagination is a matter of  illusion and for Pascal it is a matter of
sophistry. But these are more incidental remarks in a larger work focused
on unfolding productive imagination in its positive sense. It is in his
discussion of  utopia in the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia that we discover
Ricoeur’s more complete assessment of  both the positive and the
negative sides of  productive imagination. If  the best function of  utopia
is its “exploration of  the possible,”66 its ability to manifest new realities
and new truths, the pathology of  utopia is its flight into fancy,67 its
escapism, its turn to the “completely unrealizable,”68 its “magic of
thought.”69 Ricoeur was well aware of  the dangers of  productive
imagination.
And yet Ricoeur does not want to retreat from imagination to
the world of  reason alone. The good side of  productive imagination
opens us to much deeper realities and truths. For Ricoeur there remains
no bright line to distinguish the good use of  productive imagination
from the pathological. He addresses the challenge posed here with
different vocabulary in various of  his works. He calls creative imagination
“nothing other than th[e] demand put to conceptual thought . . . to
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think more.”70 Conceptual thought, in turn, tests the insights of  productive
imagination: it is reductive; it is elucidative, it seeks clarity.71 Elsewhere
Ricoeur discusses the balance between understanding and analytic
explanation, as through the social sciences.72 He argues analogously in
the context of religion that religious testimony too “requires
interpretation . . . . It needs to be tested. . . . . We must always decide
between the false witness and the truthful one for there is no
manifestation . . . without the threat of  a false testimony, and without
the decision that separates the sign from the idol.”73 There is a role for
judgment.74 In the final pages of  his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, Ricoeur
concludes that “we cannot eliminate . . . the element of  risk. We wager
on a certain set of  values and then try to be consistent with them;
verification is therefore a question of  our whole life. No one can escape
this. Anyone who claims to proceed in a value-free way will find
nothing.”75 As I apply Ricoeur’s work, then, the claim is that finally we
should not restrict ourselves to the settled expectations and boundaries
of  reproductive imagination. Instead we should recognize, even as we
critically assess, the value of  the incorporation of  productive imagination
and the anticipatory and aspirational qualities that such incorporation
implies.
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